

CHAPTER TWO GOVERNMENT IDENTITY PLANNING: CULTIVATING “TWO LOYALTIES”

This chapter analyzes the State Anthem, the State Symbols (flag and emblem), the Constitutions of 1993 and 1995, the Law of Education of 1992, and three major policy statements--the *Concept of Ethnocultural Education* (1996), the *Ideological Consolidation of society as an essential prerequisite of Kazakhstan's progress* (1993), and the *Concept of sociocultural development in the Republic of Kazakhstan* (1993)--as government attempts to consolidate the new nation. These reflect the government's stated purpose of cultivating among the people “two loyalties” (a term used in the *Concept of Ethnocultural Education*) toward their respective ethnic nationalities and toward the State.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government of Kazakhstan inherited the daunting task of trying to consolidate a new nation out of the Kazakh, Russian, and other ethnic nationalities which made up 44.3%, 35.8% and 19.9% of the population in 1994 (Bremmer & Welt, 1996: 181). In order to achieve a delicate balance of interests between the two largest groups, the Kazakhs and Russians, President Nazarbaev adopted a strategy of simultaneously prioritizing the indigenous rights of the Kazakhs as the titular ethnic nationality of the Republic, while emphasizing, in principle, the basic human rights of individuals of all ethnic nationalities. To accomplish its two-fold agenda of legitimizing its franchise of all its peoples while elevating the Kazakhs to a place of first-among-equals, the regime has been constructing its own ideology, employing distinctly Kazakh symbols and metaphors, of incorporation and enfranchisement. I will give particular attention to government attempts to construct Kazakh metaphors of inclusion.

Fasold writes (1984: 2-3) that a country obviously benefits when, to become a more cohesive polity, it evolves from being a “multinational state” of nationalities with no allegiance beyond themselves into a “multiethnic nation” of ethnic groups loyal both to themselves and the nation to which they feel they belong. For the sake of what Fishman (1969) terms “operational efficiency,” many governments attempt to reduce the ethnic nationalities to the status of ethnic groups, tolerating or encouraging their ethnocultural pluralism while discouraging or prohibiting political autonomy unless forced by a sufficiently powerful counter-elite to compromise. This is Nazarbaev's policy for the consolidation of Kazakhstan: to encourage cultural pluralism while discouraging the political autonomy for which at least some Russians are calling.

In order to consolidate Kazakhstan into a united, multiethnic nation¹, Nazarbaev is attempting to transform Kazakhstan from being a “Multi-modal” polity of two major ethnic nationalities with conflicting “Great Traditions” (Fishman, 1969) into a “Uni-modal” nation led by the Kazakh Great Tradition that subsumes, but does not negate, the traditions of the other ethnic nationalities under its wide umbrella.

The State Anthem

Given the high place of poetry and song² in Kazakh life, care was taken to choose a team of four prominent Kazakh poets³ to write the words of the new State Anthem. Due to its central

¹ W. Fierman (personal communication, October, 1998) suggests that “perhaps a major part of the impetus [for consolidation] is not domestic but rather foreign policy (pressure from Russia).”

² Poets, musicians, and scholars of music feature prominently on the paper *tenge*, Kazakhstan's currency. Ael-Farabij (870-950), philosopher, musical theorist, and “skilled musical performer” (Watt, 1967: 179) appears on the

symbolic and metaphorical importance, I give the entire Kazakh text of the Anthem followed by my own translation. I refer to a Russian translation as it helps in interpreting the original Kazakh. Interestingly, I could not find a single Russian version of the Anthem in bookstores in Almaty City but was supplied a hand-typed copy by the librarian of Aspan's Russian School. 1:1 represents stanza one, verse one and "R" is the refrain.

Throughout the Anthem, the first person plural is used. Although Kazakhstan's other ethnic nationalities could be included in the "we" without doing violence to the meaning of the Anthem's text, the choice of lexicon and the use of cultural allusions refer primarily to the Kazakhs themselves.

My analysis isolates two major clusters of themes which I continue to develop in later chapters. The first cluster deals with the expectations of former generations as fulfilled in the aspirations of present and future generations. This cluster includes the remembrance of past suffering ("from the anvil of fate, from hell itself," "having lived through so much") and duty (3:1) to the trust (3: 3,4) passed down by the ancestors and to be passed on by the present one to the next. This duty entails honor (*ar-ozhdan* in Kazakh, *chest'* in Russian) or loyalty to one's own ethnic nationality. The same theme of honor or pride is found in the first verb phrase of the Anthem, "created in honor." Although the themes of expectations of the ancestors, aspirations of the living, suffering, and honor could apply to any ethnic nationality, they are very salient in Kazakh spoken and written discourse as should become clearer as this study progresses. For this reason, I would classify this cluster of concepts as nationalistic ones.

The other group of themes I call "internationalist." These include unity, which is expressed in the Anthem by the words *birlik*, 'oneness', *eldik*, 'nationhood' in the sense of a polity of unified peoples), *tatuwlyk*, 'concord', and *dostyk*, 'friendship'. Later, I will say more about another theme in this group: the Kazakh nation being *mejirban*, 'kind and expansive' toward other ethnic nationalities.

The text and translation are followed by more detailed discussion of individual themes.

1 *Zharylgan namystan kaharman halykpyz,*
 Azattyk zholynda zhalyndap zhanyppyz.
 Tagdyrdyng tezinen, tozaktyng oezinen
 Aman saw kalyppyz, aman saw kalyppyz.

Created in honor, we are a heroic people,
Burning with zeal on the road to freedom.
From the anvil of fate, from hell itself
We have come safely through, safely through.

R *Erkindik kyrany, sharykta*
 Eldikke shakryp tirlikte!

1, 200, and 500 *tenge* bank-notes. The bard Suejinbaj (1815-1898) appears on the three *tenge* note. Instrumental composer Kurmangazy (1818-1889) is on the five *tenge* note and Abaj Kunanbaev (1845-1904), a lyric poet, is on the twenty *tenge* note. On the 10 *tenge* note appears Shokan Waelijkhanov (1835-1866), noted for his study of Kazakh oral literature. Many Kazakh homes have the folksong anthology, *Awyl keshi koengildi*, 'The Merry village party,' which contains two songs cited in this study. The book's inside cover states that it is for an *aen kumar...aen suejer kawym*, 'a song-craving...song-loving society.' Folksongs are sung and poems recited on numerous formal and informal occasions at school and at home.

³ Muzafar Aelimbaev, Zhadyra Daeribaeva, Kadyr Myrzalijev, Tumanbaj Moldagalijev.

*Alyptyng kuwaty--halykta,
Halyktyng kuwaty--birlikte!*

[Refrain]
Soar high, eagle of freedom,
Calling the people to nationhood!
The strength of a giant is in the people;
The strength of the people is in unity.

- 2 *Ardaktap anasyn, kurmettep danasyn,
Bawyrğa baskanbyz barshanyng balasyn.
Tatuwlyk, dostykyng kijeli besigi--
Mejirban Uly Otan, Kazaktyng dalasy!*

Honoring their mothers, respecting their wisdom
We have drawn the children of all close to our side.
The sacred cradle of concord and friendship
Is our merciful, Great Homeland, the Kazakh steppe!

- 3 *Talajdy oetkerdik, oetkenge salawat,
Keleshek gazhajyp, keleshek galamat!
Ar-ozhdan, ana til, oenege-saltymyz,
Erlık te, eldik te urpakka amanat!*

Having lived through so much, we have a duty to the past
To make a future of wonders and miracles!
We entrust in safe-keeping to the next generation
Our honor, mother tongue, customs, heroism, and nationhood.

Nationalist Themes

Honor

1:1 *Namys* and 3:3 *ar-ozhdan* are synonyms for [national] honor, dignity. I translate both synonyms as “honor” (as does the Russian version with *chest*) to emphasize the repetition of this central theme within the Anthem. A frequently used phrase in spoken Kazakh is *namyska tiju*, ‘to offend someone’s honor’ and is similar in meaning to the very commonly used verb *renzhuw*, ‘to be offended’. The defense of one’s *namys* (or *ar-namys*) is a salient theme in the press and at the Kazakh School site. My language tutor explained to me that, traditionally, Kazakhs considered themselves as *ardynğ kuly*, ‘slaves of honor.’ Maintenance of Kazakh is considered integral to guarding one’s honor. The Appeal of the Republic Kazakh Language Society (1990), analyzed in the next chapter, calls upon citizens to *kazak tilining...aryn arlap*, ‘guard the honor of the Kazakh language.’

Suffering

1: 3 “On the anvil of fate, from hell itself;” 3:1 “We have gone through so much.” The Kazakh is actually not “anvil” but *tez*, a wooden vice for straightening the roof poles and lattice

poles used in constructing the traditional Kazakh *kigiz uej*, ‘felt tent’. However, the main idea conveyed by the term is the same as that of an anvil: a device by which useful objects are shaped by the use of much force or pressure.

The verbal suffix of *-yp* occurring after the verbs *zhanuw*, ‘to burn’ in 1: 2 and *kaluw*, ‘to remain’ carries with it a sense of surprise. The poets seem to be conveying a survivor’s sense of wonder and gratitude.

Since the late *perestroika* period (shortly prior to and after 1990), Kazakh historians have focused on the sufferings inflicted upon them by the “center” (St. Petersburg, then Moscow) during Tsarist and Soviet times. Since the long, tortured relationship between the Russians and Kazakhs constitute a main element of “cultural baggage” (Schiffman, 1996: 276) which deeply colors Kazakh identity and views of language, it is of central importance to my thesis to present here some of the most frequently cited historical “moments” in that relationship.

Tsarist Russia began conquest of the Kazakh steppe in the 19th century with incursions of traders, soldiers, and farmers well before then. Over the decades of the latter half of the 19th century, colonizing Slavic farmers fared better than colonized Kazakhs who lost more and more of their traditional pasture lands to the incoming settlers. By the eve of the 1917 Russian revolution, the traditional Kazakh nomadic herding economy had already been severely disrupted by the massive influx of Slavic farmers (Demko, 1969). In the 1930’s, this economy was irrevocably destroyed by Stalin’s systematic and ruthless collectivization of the Kazakh herders. Olcott (1995: 184-185) quotes one estimate that “more than 1.5 million Kazakhs died during the 1930’s and nearly 80 percent of the herd was destroyed between 1928 and 1932.” She writes (1995:185-186) that losses in both human and animal life during that time were proportionately greater in Kazakhstan than anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

The end of the dreary 1930’s witnessed yet another horror: Stalin’s thorough liquidation of the Kazakh intelligentsia. In 1938 alone, the Kazakhs lost most of their greatest leaders. I mention here only two: Ahmet Bajtursun, an outstanding intellectual, educator, language reformer, and key leader in the independent Alash Party and government before the Bolshevik take-over and Magzhan Zhumabaev, considered by some the greatest Kazakh lyric poet after Abaj and the author of the influential book, *Pedagogika*. Both men were shot by firing squads.

In the first half of the 1940’s, the Russian “elder brother” mustered the Kazakhs to enter the “Great Patriotic War.” Over 450,000 Kazakhs were mobilized for military service, sending five national divisions to the front (Olcott, 1995: 188). The war years and immediate post-war years were hard times for the residents of Kazakhstan.

Soon after the War, Nikita Khrushchev and his aides devised the massive “Virgin Lands” project, the purpose of which was to transform the vast reaches of northern Kazakhstan into the USSR’s second great bread basket after the Ukraine. The term “Virgin Lands” is an affront to the Kazakhs for this area had been used as pastureland by the nomadic Kazakhs for centuries (Olcott, 1995: 224). Despite strenuous objections from Kazakh Communist Party members, an enormous area of land was plowed under, planted with wheat, and harvested by a huge new influx (mainly Slavic) agricultural workers from other Republics, who settled down to make Kazakhstan their new home. These new agriculture-related migrations significantly increased the non-indigenous population of Kazakhstan. In the 1959 census, European Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians) totaled over 52 % of Kazakhstan’s population, while the Kazakhs themselves had diminished to merely 30% of the population of their own titular republic (Brown, 1980: 4). Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands project lost momentum when he was ousted from power in

1964. It is the cruelty of fate, after so much Kazakh grazing land had been sacrificed to the project, that the land's crop productivity would wane as the strong winds of northern Kazakhstan began to blow away much of the soil's essential humus (Edwards, 1993: 34).

At the same time the Virgin Lands project was being inaugurated, the Soviets were launching another program which would have an even more devastating effect upon Kazakhstan's ecology: above-ground nuclear testing in northeast Kazakhstan. One test was done in full view of local Kazakhs, who were contaminated by fallout from the explosion due to a last minute change in wind direction. Nuclear testing in the region did not cease until 1990 (Edwards, 1993: 36), after thousands of citizens of Kazakhstan, both Kazakh and Slav, had become infected with "nuclear AIDS" (Edwards, 1993: 33).

With the heavy industrialization which began during World War II and accelerated afterwards, Kazakhstan's urban centers such as *Oeskoemen* (Ust-Kamenogorsk), *Taraz* (formerly *Zhambyl*), and *Shymkent* (Chimkent) suffered extensive air, ground and water pollution from what Margaret Loke (1992: 23) called Kazakhstan's "dark satanic mills," alluding to a poem by William Blake about the dark side of England's own intense industrialization a century and a half earlier. Workers were regularly exposed to carcinogenic chemicals, dusts, and fumes without proper protection and the once pristine air and waters of the steppe were outrageously sullied by the excesses of industrialization.

The litany of ecological disasters does not stop here. No topic evokes more melancholy and outrage than the plight of the dying Aral Sea. The much publicized drying of the Aral Sea in western Kazakhstan is the result of yet another Soviet mega-project: massive irrigation systems that divert the two main rivers, the *Amudarija* (Amu-Darya) and the *Syrdarija* (Syr-Darya), from feeding into the sea. The dry sea bed has become saturated with toxic agricultural fertilizers and pesticides and local winds lift these contaminants high into the air and dump them on nearby communities. Respiratory problems and infant mortality rates there are significantly higher than the national average. The once plentiful sturgeon and other marketable fish have died off and land productivity is down because of the chemical-laden salinity of the soil, resulting in a disease-plagued local population now bereft of their major sources of income.

Another outrage against the land during the Soviet period, described by Chingiz Aitmatov (1989, 8-9, 23-29), was the slaughter of the *akboeken*, 'steppe antelope' with helicopters and automatic rifles to fulfill meat quotas.

Instead of bringing some relief from the hardships suffered by humans, animals, the land and the waters of the steppe in the Soviet period, the dawn of Independence in December, 1991 witnessed yet another unsettling sight: the frightening free-fall of the old economy.⁴ One indicator of the severity of the economic crisis and the resultant deterioration in living standards is data cited by Oxford demographer, David Coleman (Specter, 1994: 1, 18). His statistics document the situation in Russia itself but similar trends are evident in Kazakhstan as well. According to Coleman, the average life expectancy for men had considerably declined, in some rural communities to lower than 50 years, "a level not seen since the days of the czars" (Specter, 1994: 18).

⁴ Although the economy was in dire straits in 1992 (after Independence) when the Anthem's lyrics were written, I do not mean to imply that the Anthem is referring to the economic and other problems mentioned here which have continued since Independence. They are given to supply the wider social context of the period in which the Anthem was written and thus to help in understanding the meaning of its text.

My language tutor told me of a Kazakh man in her home area of western Kazakhstan who had killed the last of his animals to feed his family and then had taken his own life in despair. Statistics document the economic decline and resultant impoverishment of the population in less personal but equally dramatic terms: Kazakhstan's 1996 gross national product plummeted to half of its size in 1990 (*EIU Kazakhstan Country Profile 1997-1998*: 20).

Many Kazakhs feel that Moscow is at least partially to blame (beside widespread local corruption) for hindering Kazakhstan's economic recovery, particularly because of Russia's persistent efforts to control Kazakhstan's promising petroleum industry. Some Kazakhs are more aware than others that the economic decline has caused suffering to Kazakhstan's ethnic Russians as well as to themselves and most, including nationalists, realize that continued cooperation with Russia is essential to economic recovery. Awareness of these realities, however, does not entirely erase Kazakh memory of countless loss of life and land inflicted by a grim and far-off metropolis.

The limited focus of this dissertation does not allow a detailed chronicle of the economic deprivation suffered by the average citizen nor does this chapter on government identity planning focus on the local level. However, mention should be made in this discussion of the economic recession, of its impact on the teachers and the parents of the pupils I observed in the village of Aspan. Life was particularly difficult for school teachers and workers at the Agricultural Institute who relied upon state salaries. With the state near bankruptcy, these salaries were meager and often delayed for months at a time. Health care in Aspan deteriorated to the point where patients often had to supply their own medications when hospitalized in the village's sparsely equipped hospital. Poor health, the lack of heat or hot water in buildings in winter, worry over daily bread, rising theft and violent crime, and extortion by the Mafia and corrupt officials, brought daily hardship to the people of the village. The situation was undoubtedly worse in thousands of villages across the land which possessed few of the advantages which Aspan enjoyed (see Chapter Four).

Aspirations

The Anthem's "eagle of freedom" represents the youthful nation's aspirations and hopes. Birds' wings, especially eagle's wings, are associated in popular Kazakh culture with youthful aspirations. *Kanat*, 'wing', is a popular male name and the youth in Aspan's Kazak School anthem are portrayed as "winged eaglets." The eagle with wings fully spread in flight is displayed prominently under the shining sun on the State Flag and on the State Emblem, the *pyraktar*, 'mythic guardian stallions', are also winged.

Sacred Duty to the Ancestors

But just as the eagle is often bound by the foot, hooded, and meticulously trained by Kazakh falconers for hunting, the aspirations of youth are carefully constrained by the expectations of their ancestors and elders. The concept of duty to the legacy of the ancestors features prominently in the State Anthem.

Stanza 3 uses two words for duty: *salawat* (3:1) and *amanat* (3:4). I translate *oetkenge salawat* as "we have a duty to the past" although it could also be translated as well as "we are indebted to the past" or "thanks to the past." The expression "to place or give a *salawat*" means to give someone a burden to carry or a duty to fulfill. Besides its explicit mention in 3:4, *amanat* might also be implied in the repeated compound word *aman-saw*, 'safely,' in 1: 4. because

amanat and *aman-saw* are sometimes used in collocations with the meaning of safely keeping a trust.

In the context of the State Anthem, *amanat* (literally, 'hostage') means a cultural or spiritual deposit kept in safe-keeping by earlier generations for later ones. The inference in the Anthem is that the precious heritage of "our honor, mother tongue, customs, heroism, and nationhood" has been guarded by great personal sacrifice by past heroes and that it is up to the present and future generations to emulate their noble example. The youth are simply not free to do whatever they want: they are tightly bound to fulfill the responsibilities placed upon them by their exemplary ancestors. The past, therefore, influences every step taken in the present. As Auguste Comte memorably puts it, "*Les Morts gouvernent les Vivants.*"⁵

The essence of the worthy ways of the ancestors is summed up in the phrase in 3:3, *oenege-saltymyz*, 'our exemplary customs.' The authors' use of the modifier *oenege*, 'model or exemplary,' might imply that some customs are perhaps not as exemplary as others. For instance, in Abaj's *Karasoez*, a widely influential collection of fifty-five short essays, he refers to "bad" and "good" proverbs, implying that some teachings of the elders are more commendable than others. Abaj also condemns the traditional custom of *barymta*, "punitive raids launched against rival clans in which livestock was captured" (Krippes, 1994: 39 and see Virginia Martin's (1966: 198-221) in-depth treatment of this custom). A feeling of constraint by the legacy of the ancestors does not prevent the present generation from making its own decisions as to which customs it chooses to follow and which not. Thomas Eriksen of Oslo, working within the great anthropological tradition of Fredrik Barth, agrees with Ernest Renan (1992[1882]) that the construction of ethnic nationality identity involves not only shared memories, "but also a great deal of shared forgetting" (Eriksen, 1993: 92-93).

Some things must be forgotten so that the most important things can be remembered. The Anthem expresses (in 1:1, 2:4 and 3:4) what things are important. These include the exemplary customs themselves, history (edited by this generation to fit the demands of the times while fulfilling their honor-bond duty to the ancestors), the land, and the mother tongue. It is these four things (language, land, history, and custom) which I mentioned in Chapter One and will mention in Chapter Seven that are essential ingredients in the formation of ethnic nationality consciousness according to the celebrated Kazakh poet Mukhtar Shahanov.

Internationalist Themes

Unity

R:1, 3:4 *Eldik*, 'nationhood,' R:4 *birlik*, 'oneness,' and indirectly, 2:3 *tatuwlyk*, 'concord,' and 2: 3 *dostyk*, 'friendship,' point to the idea of unity among the various ethnic nationalities. *Eldik* means 'being together as one people, joined in unison to create a sense of nationhood.'⁶ *Tatuwlyk* carries the meanings of harmony, concord, reconciliation, friendly relations. Kengesbaev (1959: 43, 1961: 341) gives it as an antonym of *araz*, animosity, quarreling, or disagreement. Therefore *tatuwlyk* implies the resolution of conflict between parties previously at odds with one another. The word, like *dostyk*, has suffered from decades of overuse in slogans, worn-out by the Soviet Union's intensive propaganda effort to maintain peace among its numerous ethnic nationalities.

⁵ The dead rule the living. Cited in Pfaff, 1993: 12.

⁶ D. Babasova & R. C. Weller, personal communication, August 18, 1996.

Kindness and Mercy toward non-Kazakhs

The concept of kindness and mercy, related to that of unity and friendship above, is expressed in the text by numerous forms such as 2:1 *ana*, ‘mother,’ and 2: 2, *bawyrğa baskanbyz barshanyng balasyn*, ‘we draw everyone’s children close to ourselves.’ Here, the phrase *bawyrğa basuw* (literally, ‘to press to one’s liver or side’) can mean to raise children, to embrace, to draw to one’s self. Other forms include 2:3 *kijeli besigi*, ‘sacred cradle,’ and the adjective in 2:4, *mejirban*, ‘kind and expansive’.

In 2:2, the informal Russian translation I obtained from the Russian School reads *v godinu liho letja my raspahnuli svoj objatja vsem*, ‘in times of trouble, we fling our arms wide open.’ During World War II, Kazakhs, already stretched by the war effort, showed great kindness to immigrants who came to Kazakhstan under great duress, such as the ethnic Germans forcibly relocated from the Volga by Stalin. On several occasions, I have heard people tell of the kindness of Kazakhs in times of need and have met one ethnic-German who was taken in and raised by a Kazakh family when his impoverished and widowed mother was unable to take care of him and his many siblings. The family raised him as one of their own, yet, in deference to his mother’s religion, did not circumcise him according to Muslim tradition.

The metaphor created in stanza two is that of the state of Kazakhstan as a kind, merciful Kazakh mother showing hospitality to all those who come to the door of her tent:

Metaphor of the State as Merciful Mother (in State Anthem)	
Source Domain	Target Domain
<i>Kazak dalasy</i> , ‘the Kazakh steppe’	<i>Otan</i> , ‘the homeland’
<i>mejirban [ana]</i> , ‘merciful [mother]’	[<i>memleket</i>], [‘the state’]
<i>kijeli bejsik</i> , ‘sacred cradle’	<i>tatuwlyk, dostyk</i> ‘concord, friendship’
<i>barshanyng balasyn</i> , ‘the children of all’	[<i>barlyk ulttar</i>], [‘all ethnic nationalities’]
<i>bawyrğa baskanbyz</i> ,	[political and social

'we embrace'	incorporation]
<i>ardaktap anasyn, kurmettep danasyn</i> 'honoring their mothers, respecting their wisdom'	[cultural pluralism]

“Honoring their (other ethnic nationalities’) mothers, respecting their wisdom” for the metaphor is not one of Kazakh condescension toward the other groups but, taking the text at face value, one of respect: honoring their cultures and languages and allowing the other ethnic nationalities the room to develop them.

The contrast between the Anthem’s Kazak-nation-as-kind- mother metaphor to a well-known example of American symbolism should prove illustrative. An affluent, nineteenth century American majority could portray America in the Statue of Liberty as the “New Colossus” welcoming the huddled masses to its shores, but such an example seems hardly appropriate to describe the economically weak Kazakhs who make up less than half of the population in their own Republic and who are dwarfed, demographically and geographically by Russia next door. The Kazakh metaphor of the strong, kind mothers is convincing, however, because, despite the gigantic size of Russia, Kazakhstan is still a vast country (ninth largest in the world in land area) and the Kazakhs have proven their hospitality on innumerable occasions to those less fortunate than themselves.

The State Symbols

The following explanation of the State Flag and Emblem are based on a booklet *Kazak elining raemizderi*, ‘State symbols of the Kazakh nation,’ written by Erbol Shajmerdenov (1993), a politician, journalist, and member of the special group appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan to create the new State symbols. The forward of the text was written by Aebish Kekilbaev, writer, people’s deputy, and then Head of the Supreme Soviet’s Committee on the Development of Ethnic Policy, Culture and Language. The book was published by the Ministry of Publication and Mass Media. Shajmerdenov’s interpretation of the symbols can be considered as representative of the regime which commissioned his work in creating them. For documentation of the historical precedents for the various symbols he describes and explains in the text, the author has compiled a reference list of 135 scholarly works in Russian and Kazakh.

The State Flag



Shaeken Ongbasynuly Nijjzbekov from Almaty City was the winner of the State sponsored competition of flag designs (Turlygulov, 1995: 242). Shajmerdenov discusses the flag's field of sky blue and the three figures of the sun, the eagle, and the traditional Kazakh design along the left side.

Koek, 'light blue,' is a color of historical significance to the Kazakhs: their ancestors, the Turks of the Turk Kaghanate (Sinor, 1990: 285-316) founded in the seventh century A.D., were known as the *koek*, 'blue,' Turks meaning "heavenly Turks" or "divine Turks." Shajmerdenov writes:

under this precious flag which is the color of the sky, they breached the walls of their merciless enemies and defended every last inch of their vast homeland. A distinguished, distinct civilization known as 'nomadic culture' was established. And the original place, the homeland of this Turkic people was our Kazakh nation. According to the conclusions of scholars, the Kazakhs are the people who have most assimilated and kept the characteristics of the [Blue] Turks. This is clearly felt in the language we use today (p. 23).

The blue is also associated with the totemistic "blue-maned male wolf," symbol of the ancient Turks (p. 24).

In explaining the symbol of the sun, Shajmerdenov refers to ancient Central Asian sun worship (p. 30), Kazakh customs associated with the sacredness of fire (p. 31), and the petroglyph figures with sun-heads from the seventh to fourth centuries B.C. found in Siberia and Central Asia (pp. 31, 32). Central Asian nomads considered the sun to be a symbol of life (p. 31). A blazing sun also shines out from the center of the flag of neighboring Republic of Kyrgyzstan for the previously nomadic Kyrgyz people possess a cultural heritage quite similar to that of the Kazakhs.

In the history of Rashid-ad-Din, the Oghuz Kaghan, ruler of another ancient Turkic kaghanate, gave the limitless sacred steppe to his third son as an inheritance, suggesting the eagle as his state emblem (p. 32). According to Shajmerdenov, the eagle stands for the rule of government, far-sightedness, and *kengdik*, ‘generosity, vastness, immensity’ (p.23).

For steppe dwellers the eagle symbolizes *erkindik*, ‘freedom,’ and, as mentioned earlier, the aspirations of a youthful nation:

It is clear that the picture of the eagle on our flag is clearly born of a good intention: having become independent, the Kazakh nation with spread wings strives tirelessly for the heights of world civilization and will indisputably arrive there (p. 33).

Finally, the author praises the artistry of traditional Kazakh decoration, an example of which, called the “ram’s horn” design, borders the left side of the Flag. The author says that the designs reflect the *oershil*, ‘unflinching, incorruptible’ spirit of the people and the spirit of the *darkan dala*, ‘generous steppe’ (p. 34). The author associates generosity and kindness with the people of the steppe as does the State Anthem. The ram’s horn design may also be a reference to the traditional herding culture of the Kazakhs (W. Fierman, personal communication, October, 1998).

In summary, the most striking impression made by this explanation of the Flag is that it is completely ethnocentric. There is nothing which explicitly suggests the multinational composition of the country. On the other hand however, like the flag of neighboring Kyrgyzstan, there are no distinctly Islamic symbols on it such as the crescent moon found on the new flags of the other former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and on the flag of the Republic of Turkey.⁷ The Flag, even more than the Anthem, is strongly ethnocentric while expressing a welcome, symbolized by the domestic warmth of the ram’s horn design and the sun that shines indiscriminately on all including those who are not native to the steppe.

The State Emblem



⁷ In the summer of 1992, I observed a demonstrator opposite the parliament building advocating, among other things, the use of Islamic symbols on the State Flag.

From the 245 entries in the competition for the design of the State Emblem, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan chose that of Zh. Maelibekuly (Turlygulov, 1995: 241). The main elements of the Emblem are its name, “Kazakhstan,” a pair of mythic winged, horned steeds, the *shanggyrak*, ‘wooden-frame for the smoke hole,’ at the apex of the traditional felt tent, the *wyk*, ‘roof poles,’ radiating out from it, and the five-pointed star that shines down from the firmament above the tent.

The “sacred, black” *shanggyrak* at the top of the traditional felt tent is a symbol of the hospitality of the Kazakh people (p. 43) and for the Kyrgyz neighboring nation who display it on their state flag inside the sphere of the blazing sun. It is blackened by countless fires on the hearth below it, fires built to boil tea and cook food for innumerable invited guests. The honored guest who gives the traditional *bata*, ‘blessing,’ after the conclusion of a meal, prays that his or her host’s *shanggyrak* will not be shaken, that is, that no calamity will befall the host’s family.

The *pyraktar*, ‘winged, horned war-steeds,’ are modeled after the fifth to fourth centuries B. C. gold-plated winged, horned horses excavated by Kemal Akyshev of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in 1969-1970 from the stele of a Scythian chieftain, the famous Golden Man, in Esik near Almaty City (*Esik obasy* in *KES*, 4: 198). These finely crafted horses formed part of the Scythian chieftain’s elaborate headdress (Akyshev, 1983: 38-39, 68-69).⁸ Shajmerdenov discusses the centrality of the horse in nomadic culture and comments on the horns as being a symbol of fierce bravery from early times (p. 51).

A five-cornered star was found on the Turkic monument of Kueltegin (731 A.D.) so it also has ancient precedent. Being a symbol associated with the internationalism of the Soviet period, the author combines the themes of the glory of ancient Central Asia and a new internationalism by stating that the Kazakhs should strive toward world culture while keeping their own traditions (p. 53). The author also mentions a *asyl arman*, ‘precious aspiration,’ expressed in Kazakh speech: *bagymyz ashlyp, zhuldyzymyz zharkyraj bersin*, ‘may our stars of good fortune continue to shine.’ The “star of happiness” is a common expression which will be encountered in later chapters. Stars and astrology also tie in with the theme of fate mentioned in the third line of the Anthem.

The name “Kazakhstan” appears clearly in bold letters at the bottom of the Emblem. Shajmerdenov dwells on the antiquity of the word “Kazakh” (pp. 54-55), calling into question those who would give a late date to the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs as a distinct people.

The general impression projected by the Emblem is the enormous antiquity and glory of indigenous Central Asian nomadic culture. Antiquity and indigenusness are central to the Kazakh argument to assert their rights as first among equals in their titular Republic. This appeal to ancient indigenusness as the basis of political privilege will be seen below in the final version of the 1995 Constitution.

⁸ Some 4,000 pieces of thin gold comprise the Golden Man’s decorative armor and headdress (King, Noble, and Humphreys, 1996: 195). Confirmation of the antiquity of the Golden Man is found in the strikingly similar headdresses of the Scythian chieftains found in the relief on the staircase excavated in the ancient Persian city of Persepolis (Akyshev, 1983: 38). A replica of the Golden Man is displayed in the Central State Museum in Almaty City. He was featured on the first postage stamp after Independence.

The Constitutions of 1993 and 1995 (Draft and Final Versions)⁹

A detailed comparative analysis is not the aim here, rather a discussion of salient themes which help build a framework for understanding governmental attitudes concerning national identity, which in turn affect governmental language orientations. I have translated the State Anthem and the draft version of the 1995 Constitution myself, but I refer to the “official English translation”¹⁰ for the final versions of the 1993 and 1995 Constitutions. These “official English translations,” however, unlike my own which is based on the Kazakh versions of the text, are based on the official Russian versions and are sometimes stylistically inelegant, so I use them only as references. The original texts of the Constitutions and other government documents examined in this chapter were “almost certainly” first composed in Russian (W. Fierman, personal communication, October, 1998) but I prefer the Kazakh versions in order to compare the Kazakh words used in the government level documents with those used in the school site’s textual artifacts and spoken discourse which are mainly in Kazakh.

The preamble of the first Constitution of the post-Soviet period, ratified on January 28, 1993 begins:

*Biz, Kazakhstan, halky,
duenijehuezilik kogamdastyktyng azhyramas boeligi bola otyryp,
Kazakh memlekettiligining bulzhymastygyn negizge ala otyrp,
adam kukygy men bostandygynyng basymdygyn tanee otyryp,
demokratijalyk khogam men kukykyk memleket kuruwga bekem bel
bajylap,
azamattyk tatuwlyk pen ultaralyk kelisimdi, oezimiz ueshin zhaene oez
urpaktarymyz ueshin lajykty oemirdi kamtamasyz etuwdi kalaj otyryp,
osy Konstitutsijany kabyldajmyz...*

We, the people of Kazakhstan,
being an inalienable part of the world community,
emanating from the unshakable nature of Kazakh statehood,
acknowledging the priority of human rights and freedoms;
fully resolved to create a democratic society and law-based state,
desiring to ensure civil peace, inter-ethnic nationality accord, and a worthy
life for ourselves and our descendants,
adopt this Constitution...

The text is striking in its emphasis on the themes of inclusion and human rights. As do the draft and the final version of the 1995 Constitution which superseded this one, the preamble begins inclusively: “We, the people of Kazakhstan.” All ethnic nationalities resident in Kazakhstan are included. Furthermore, this subject noun phrase is followed by five clauses, the

⁹ The entire texts of the Kazakh and Russian draft versions of the Constitutions and other significant legislation are published in the newspapers for public debate which is intended to help policy makers in their drafting of the final versions. The draft version of the January, 1993 Constitution was published in newspapers the preceding summer in June, 1992.

¹⁰ As provided in Blaustein & Flanz (1994) and Flanz (1996) listed in Bibliography under Republic of Kazakhstan Laws, Decrees, etc.

first and third of which imply Kazakhstan's inclusiveness both internationally and intranationally, that is, the "law-based" state's responsibility to both the other nations beyond its borders as "an integral part of the world community" and to all its own citizens, "acknowledging the priority of human rights and freedoms."

In the fifth clause, *tatuwlyk*, the word for "peace" in the phrase "civil peace," and *kelisim*, the word for "accord" in the phrase "inter-ethnic nationality accord," both imply verbal agreement.

There is one phrase in the second modifying clause of the preamble, however, that seems to contradict the prevalent theme of inclusiveness, that is, "Kazakh¹¹ statehood" instead of "Kazakhstan statehood." The former phrase implies statehood as defined by the Kazakh people. The phrase is interpreted by Kazakh nationalists as statehood (primarily) of the Kazakhs. Note the wording of the first basic principle of the Constitution immediately after the preamble: "The Republic of Kazakhstan, as a form of statehood self-determined by the Kazakh *ult*, "ethnic nationality," ensures the equal rights of all its citizens." How can ethnically non-Kazakh citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan be ensured equal rights, if they have already been excluded from one of the most basic rights of democracy, that is, determination of the fundamental nature of their own state?

Evidently, the Kazakhs are first among equals: they lead in the process of statehood formation without entirely excluding the contribution of others. That the Kazakhs do not arrogate all state power is borne out by the latter part of the fourth basic principle:

The people of Kazakhstan are the sole bearer of state power in the Republic. The people exercise state power directly and through their representatives. *No part of the people* [emphasis mine]...can appropriate to themselves the sole right to exercise state power.

In the last sentence above, "no part of the people" could be interpreted as the part of the people (forty-six percent of the total population of Kazakhstan in 1996) who are ethnically Kazakh. This clearly means that the other ethnic nationalities are to share in governance as well.

The preambles of both the draft and the final versions of the 1995 Constitution address the inherent tension between equality of human rights and Kazakh prerogative. Before discussing these, however, I give the preamble of the final 1995 version in its entirety. This Constitution was passed by public referendum on August 30, 1995 (see the beginning of Chapter Seven) and is still in effect at the time of this writing.

*Biz, ortak tarijihij tagdyr biriktirgen Kazakhstan halky,
bajyrgy Kazakh zherinde memlekettilik kura otyryp,
oewizimizdi erkindik, tengdik zhaene tatuwlyk murattaryna
berilgen bejbitshil azamattyk khogam dep ugyna otyryp,
duenijezhuezilik kogamdastykta lajyky oryn aluwdy tilej otyryp,
kazyrgy zhaene bolashak urpaktar aldyndagy
zhogary zhawapkershiligimizdi sezine otyryp,
oewizimizding egemendik kukygymyzdy negizge ala otyryp,
osy Konstitutsijany kabyldajmyz.*

¹¹ There is precedence for this, of course, in the former official title, the *Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic*.

We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic fate,
establishing statehood on the ancient, indigenous Kazakh land,
understanding ourselves to be a peace-loving, civil society,
dedicated to the aims of liberty, equality, and concord,
desiring to take a worthy place in the world community,
sensing our great responsibility to this and future generations,
based upon our sovereign right,
do adopt this Constitution.

In the place of the phrase “Kazakh statehood” in the 1993 Constitution, the 1995 draft version substitutes the phrase “statehood on the *aezhelgi*, ‘ancient,’ Kazakh land” which the final version, given above, changes to “statehood on the *bajyrgy*, ‘indigenous and ancient,’ Kazakh land.” The implication seems to be that the right and privilege of active involvement in the formation of statehood is not confined to the ethnic Kazakhs only, but should nevertheless be profoundly influenced by the fact that this land has historically belonged to the Kazakhs.

The change from the draft phrase of *aezhelgi*, ‘ancient, former,’ to the final wording of *bajyrgy*, ‘indigenous, native, aboriginal, ancient,’ is worth noting. The former word, *aezhelgi*, can mean either ‘ancient, very old’ or ‘former, past, previous’ depending upon its context. The official Russian version uses the word *drevnij* which carries the meanings of ‘ancient, antique, classical.’ The latter word, *bajyrgy*, carries the double meaning of ‘ancient, very old’ and ‘indigenous, native, aboriginal;’ it is used to refer to original Kazakh versus foreign loan words and to the original, indigenous inhabitants of a land. The Russian version uses the word *iskonnij*, meaning ‘primordial, age-old’ and also “indigenous, native, aboriginal” when used to modify the noun *obitatel*, ‘inhabitant.’ Thus *bajyrgy* of the final version, emphasizes more strongly than *aezhelgi* of the draft, the priority and prerogative of the Kazakhs to the land, based not only upon the principle of antiquity, but also upon that of indigenesness. These related themes of antiquity and indigenesness have already been encountered in Shajmerdenov’s analysis of the symbolism of the State Flag and Emblem.

Another significant revision from 1993 to 1995 is the addition of a modifier to the opening noun phrase “we, the people of Kazakhstan:” “we, the people of Kazakhstan *united by a common historical fate*.” This modifier echoes, whether wittingly or unwittingly, the words from the State Anthem “from the anvil of fate, we have come safely through.” Unlike the ambiguous “we” of the Anthem, however, the first person plural in the 1995 Constitution clearly refers to all the ethnic nationalities of the Republic. This modifier emphasizing the shared experience of the Republic’s ethnic nationalities is a splendid vocalization of the “‘internationalist’ theme in the Soviet sense of harmonious inter-ethnic relations”(Akiner 1995: 80). The direct implication of the final draft of the 1995 Constitution is that all the inhabitants of Kazakhstan, regardless of ethnic nationality, are bound together by a shared past, present, and future. It is saying, in effect, “we are in this thing together.”

President Nazarbaev expresses this theme of shared destiny in an interview (Nazarbaev, 1994a: 37-38):¹²

¹² I modify the translation of Nazarbaev, 1994a slightly to be more readable since it seems to have been done by a non-native English speaker.

I was brought up in a Russian environment...all my father's friends were Russians and Ukrainians. I studied at school together with their children... We have many good memories to recall. Among others, it was the Panfilov division¹³ which defended Moscow in 1941. This division was formed [in Kazakhstan] about 25 kilometers from Almaty. Kazakhs and Russians alike found their deaths on battle-fields in the heart of Russia.

Kazakhs and Russians harvest wheat fields in Akmola, mine together in Karagandy, and drill oil together in Atyrau. During my first visit to Almaty City in the summer of 1992, I was struck by the high degree of integration among Russians, Kazakhs, and other ethnic nationalities in the city's numerous apartment complexes. Many Kazakhs deny that the demonstrations of December, 1986 were anti-Russian *per se* (Akiner, 1995: 56; Janabel 1996: 10). They perceive them, rather, as resulting from ill-advised policy decisions rather than from inter-ethnic nationality animosity.¹⁴ "The majority of the titular people [the Kazakhs] are by no means ill-disposed towards the Slavs or other non-Kazakh minorities (Akiner 1995: 71)."

The 1995 draft and final versions retain the same format of nine basic principles following the preamble as does the 1993 Constitution but they include almost twice as much text. A major difference between the 1995 draft and final versions is that the draft consistently uses the *Kazakh Respublikasy*, 'Kazakh Republic,' and the final version the *Kazakhstan Respublikasy*, 'Republic of Kazakhstan.' This seems to be a definite swing away from the "nationalist" theme to the "internationalist" theme. Further in the internationalist direction, the 1993 Constitution's phrase "form of statehood self-determined by the Kazakh nation" has been dropped in both 1995 versions and the phrase *Kazakstandyk patrijotizm*, 'Kazakhstani patriotism,' added to the second section of the first basic principle:

Respublika kyzmetining tuebegejli prinstipteri: kogamdyk tatuwlyk pen sayasij turaktylyk; buekil halyktyng ijgiligin koezdetijtin ekonomijalyk damuw; Kazakstandyk patrijotizm; memleket oemirining asa mangyzdy maeselerin demokratijalyk aedistermen...sheshuw.

The fundamental principles of the activity of the Republic of Kazakhstan are public concord and political stability; economic development for the benefit of all the people of the nation; *Kazakhstani patriotism* [emphasis mine]; and the resolution of the most important issues of the state by democratic means...

This modifier *Kazakstandyk*, 'Kazakhstani,' seems to be a neologism (although Krippes, 1994 does not list it as one). I do not recall it being used often, if at all, by teachers at the Kazakh School in social science and language and literature classes when referring to the responsibility

¹³ A striking monument with an eternal flame, dedicated to the Panfilov division's defense of Moscow, dominates the large, wooded park by that name in the center of Almaty City.

¹⁴ Carrere d'Encausse contradicts this. During the December, 1986 riots, she writes, "young people armed with iron bars and paving stones...gathered on the main square, shouting "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs and only the Kazakhs (1993: 32)!" The USSR Central Committee's report on the riots "confirmed that this was not the first attack on internationalism by the young people of Kazakhstan; they had already demonstrated in the city of Tselinograd in 1979. The 1979 incident...was actually a riot marked by interethnic violence" (1993: 38).

of citizens.¹⁵ At school, the term *azamat*, ‘citizen’ is typically modified by “Kazakh” not by “Kazakhstani.”¹⁶ It is because of this failure to hear this term by Kazakhs that it sounded so foreign to me when I first heard an American expatriate use the term “Kazakhstani.” At the time of my residence in Kazakhstan (1994-1996), Russians and Kazakhs both might have shared a common sense of being citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, but a newly forged “Kazakhstani” identity did not seem to exist and, I believe, will still take a generation or several generations to develop.

The final version of the 1995 Constitution, however, seems almost excessive in its emphasis on a new intranational identity, for it retains the word “patriotism” as a calque, instead of using the acceptable Kazakh form of *patriottyk* (Mahmuwdov & Muwsabaev, 1989: 272) or the Kazakh word *elzhandylyk*.¹⁷ Too much should not be made of this, however, for it seems that in everyday Kazakh usage, the calque form is used as a noun and the Kazakh form as an adjective.

In summary, this analysis of the basic principles of the successive drafts of the 1993 and 1995 Constitutions indicates a progressively internationalist inclination which might reflect the current regime’s solidification of power over nationalistic factions among both the Kazakh and Russian ethnic nationalities. This trend and emphasis seem at odds, however, with the nationalist theme which persists in the 1995 preamble: the prerogative of the “ancient and indigenous” Kazakh people to determine the direction of the Republic which bears their name. The regime justifies this apparent contradiction by its appeal, as will be seen below, to the universal rights of indigenous peoples as defined by the United Nations.

The ever-present tension between the regime’s prioritization of indigenous rights on the one hand and its increased emphasis on internationalism and universal human rights on the other hand has a linguistic parallel, namely, the government’s jittery balancing act of elevating the main indigenous language, Kazakh, to official status while continuing to recognize Russian, considered by nationalist Kazakhs as a non-indigenous “foreign language,” as the Republic’s main language-of-wider communication.

Law of Education of 1992 and Concept of Ethnocultural Education of 1996

The tension between constructing a Kazakh ethnic nationality identity and the development of a shared trans-ethnic statehood identity is also reflected in the Law of Education of 1992, ratified only a month after the Republic’s declaration of independence. The document expresses the hope that the youth of Kazakhstan will be socialized with both ethnic nationality and general human values in order to become valuable citizens:

*Bilim beriw zhuejesin basty mindeti--ulattyk zhaene zhalpyadamzattyk kazynalar,
gylym... zhetistikteri negizinde zheke adamy kalypastyruw...*

¹⁵ However, I did not consistently attend the ninth grade course on civil laws and rights which is a standard part of the curriculum and where issues of citizenship and the Constitution are explicitly discussed .

¹⁶ It would be revealing for state identity research to conduct comparative ethnographic fieldwork in the Kazakh School and Russian School in Aspan to determine their respective use or lack of use of the term “Kazakhstani.”

¹⁷ *Elzhandylyk* is used in the Kazakh School’s student organization anthem to be seen later. The use of this Kazakh word of old Turkic etymology instead of the Russian form “*patriotizm*” is in keeping with the Kazakh School’s ethnic authenticity.

The main task of the educational system is...the formation...of the individual on the basis of ethnic nationality values, general human values, and the achievements of science...

Bilim beriw zhuejesining negizgi mindetteri mynalar...adamgershilik pen salawatty oemir saltynyng berik negizderin kalyptastyruw... azamattykty... kogamnyng zhaene memleketting aldyndagy zhaeke adamnyng hukylary men mindetterin ugynduwgy...taerbijlew...Kazakh halkynyng maedenieti men daestur-saltyn okyp-uejrenuw ueshin zhagdajlar zhasaw.

The [other] principal tasks of the educational system are...the formation of the solid principles of a humane and sober-minded life-style...training in citizenship and understanding the individual's rights and duties toward... society and the State...and the learning and study of Kazakh ethnic nationality traditions and customs.

The *Concept of Ethnocultural Education*, passed as a Presidential Order on July 15, 1996, and the other documents analyzed in this chapter constitute official statements of government policy although not having the weight of law as do the Constitution and the other laws which I mention. The *Concept of Ethnocultural Education* elaborates on points which the Law of Education of 1992 only briefly mentions. I received only the English translation of this document late in my research but still include it, without the Kazakh text, because of its importance as a major policy statement on identity and language planning, i.e. the construction of ethnic nationality and statehood identity and language orientations. Since my copy of the text is a print-out from an on-line document, I cannot cite standardized page numbers. I will deal with the document's formulation of identity planning here and will postpone language orientations until the following chapter.

The purpose of the document is the development of an "ethnocultural education strategy [which] is directed at the realization of two interrelated goals: ethnic identification and state integration." This statement represents an expression of the two goals of new nation-states expressed by Fishman, 1969: 111-113: establishing ethnic authenticity (nationalism) and operational efficiency (nationism). The document urges throughout for the cultivation of "'two loyalties' with regard to [people's] own ethnic group and with regard to the state," that is, the construction of two identities related to these twin goals of the new Republic: "ethnic identity" or "ethnocultural identity" and "state identity." It urges the formation of "both an ethnic and a state historical consciousness" and advocates that the history of Kazakhstan be "perceived as the history of all peoples who have lived and who currently live in this ancient land." Ethnocultural education is to instill the ideal of political unity of the peoples but also of "cultural pluralism."

It is not surprising that the document promotes the socialization of "multicultural" and "multilingual" pupils. As such, it provides a strong conceptual basis, as will be seen in the next chapter, for a language-as-resource orientation and an enrichment bilingual education model type. The document's balanced and strongly positive approach is compromised, though, by the same nagging ambivalence which haunts the State symbols and the other government level documents examined so far. Specifically, what *is* the priority in state policy: the rights of all citizens to develop their cultures or the rights of the indigenous peoples to do the same? The text

is unclear, for in one place it says, “The constitutional consolidation of ethnic nationality equality proceeds from the principle of the priority of the rights of the individual” and in another place, it argues for the “recognition and support of the unconditional priority for the individual of the native language and culture.” This continual vacillation between priorities of all citizens as opposed to the specific rights of the indigenous peoples has created palpable malaise and confusion among both Kazakhs and Russians as to the real intent of government policy.

But there is some indication in the text as to what that intent may be. Under the section entitled “A Multicultural Individual,” the writers of the text argue that the prioritization of indigenous cultural revival is not a selfish exercise in putting the fulfillment of one’s own needs before the needs of others, but the necessary groundwork for laying the “foundation of a concerned attitude for others.” “A multicultural individual is understood to be an individual who is oriented toward others through his own culture.” Individuals can not be “oriented toward others through [their] own culture” if they do not possess a culture of their own.¹⁸

An important linkage should be made between being “oriented toward others through one’s own culture” and the cultural image of the kind Kazakh mother embracing children of all ethnic nationalities. The State Anthem, Flag, and Emblem are examples of the ideal of ethnocultural education expressed above, that of showing respect and consideration for others as a result of the development of traditional Kazakh sensibilities of compassion and unfettered hospitality. The policy of prioritization of indigenous culture and language is perceived as being not at the expense of other peoples and cultures but for their sakes as well. The *Concept of Ethnocultural Education* seems to argue for the cultivation of Kazakh culture and its tradition of hospitality in order that Kazakhs show the respect due to all ethnic nationalities in Kazakhstan.

Ideological Consolidation of Society

As President Nazarbaev continued to consolidate a strong presidential rule, he issued in his name a major policy statement entitled *Ideological consolidation of society as an essential prerequisite of Kazakhstan’s progress*. It first appeared in the *Kazakhstanskaja Pravda* on October 9, 1993.

At first glance, it seems that President Nazarbaev’s highest societal priority is the affirmation of human rights regardless of ethnic nationality affiliation:

*Biz kuryp zhatkan kogamnyng eng zhogary kundylygy--adam, buakil
oegeristerding baeri sol ueshin, sonyng ijgiligi ueshin zhasalyp zhatyr.
Adamdardyng zang zhuezinde kukyktary men bostandyktarynyng
kepildigi kamtasyz etilgen, toptasuw, adamgershilik, ultaralyk kelisim, barlyk
ulttar men ulystardyng tengdigi idealary negizgelgen.*

The highest value of the society we are building is man, in whose name and for whose good the transformations have been initiated. The people’s rights and liberties have been guaranteed and the ideals of consolidation, humanism, inter-

¹⁸ Hornberger (1998: 25) writes of a similar view, expressed by indigenous educators in South America, that interculturality, which includes respect of people from different cultures, “must begin with one’s self, with developing an understanding of one’s own identity.”

ethnic nationality accord, and the equality of all nations and nationalities has been established (p. 38)¹⁹

Nazarbaev is clearly in favor of an internationalist approach; he attempts to provide a new ideology which will sail the ship of state clear of the two evils, the “myths of crude Soviet ideology” (ICS: 9) and

kogamdyk kurylymnyng koene formalaryn zhandandyruwga, Kazak kogamynyng XVIII-XIX gasyrlardagy territorijalyk ujymdasuwyna taen ruwlyk-tajpalyk psikhologia men kukykyk koezkaras zhuejesin kajta zhandandyruwga negizdelgen daestuerli sijpatty sajasij ideologia mueldem kabyldanbajtyn bolady.

the political ideology of the [Kazakh] traditional type, which is based on a resuscitation of archaic forms of social arrangement, horde-tribe mentality, and a system of legal views characteristic of the territorial organization of Kazakh society of the 18th-19th centuries (p.40).

Yet Nazarbaev is also in favor of a nationalist approach to some degree. Despite his concern over the revival of divisiveness between the various Kazakh hordes,²⁰ tribes and clans which was one of the reasons for Kazakh failure to resist the encroachments of the Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries (Bodger, 1991: 344-345), Nazarbaev believes in the immensely positive and effective psycho-social role of the revival of traditions for the present and future generations to get their bearings in a time of disruptive change:

...burynggy kasang kagijdalar zharamsyz bolyp kalgan kezde nege nazar awdaruw kerek? Sirae, karapajym aeri tuesinikti, sonymen birge aer halyktyng tereng ijmandylyk pen ruwhanij negizderge--daetuerlerge nazar awdaruw kerek...Maedenij daestuerler kashanda elewmattik kajta tuelewding kajnar koezi bolyp keldi. Oezining tarijhyi maedenij tamyrlaryna kajta oraluw--bul, aerijne, ong protsess...Nak osy daestuer adamnyng 'zhogalyk ketpewine,' oez turmysynyng sijpatyn kazirgi duenijening kuert oezgeristerine bejimdewge muemkindik beredi.

...to what can we turn if the previous [socialist] tenets have proven bankrupt? To, most likely, that which is most simple, comprehensible and at the same time profoundly moral and spiritual in the life of each people--traditions... Cultural traditions have always been a source of social revival. A return to one's

¹⁹ I use both ICS (*Ideological Consolidation of Society*), an English version published by the Kazakhstan government in pamphlet form, and the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service's English translation (FBIS-USR-94-003, January 12, 1993 pps. 38-49) as my basis, but also refer to the Kazakh text, making changes to the existing English translations for more accuracy and readability.

²⁰ The Kazakhs are divided into three *zhuez*, 'hordes': *uly zhuez*, 'Great Horde,' *orta zhuez*, 'Middle Horde', and *kishi zhuez*, 'Small Horde,' who traditionally inhabited three roughly defined regions of Kazakhstan. Most adult Kazakhs, unless they have been assimilated into Russian culture, know to which *zhuez*, 'horde,' *ruw*, 'tribe,' and *tajpa*, 'clan,' they belong. Horde identity, though discouraged by the Soviets and by the present government, still plays a significant role in politics and social life today.

historical cultural roots is, of course, a positive process....It is traditions that enable a person to 'keep his bearings' and adapt his way of life to the impetuous changes of the modern world (p.40).

Elsewhere he states:

Ultyk kozgalystardyng, aesirese, zhanga taewelsiz memleketterde orasan zor roel atkaratynyna eshkimning de koezin zhetkizin zhatuwdyng kazheti bola kojmas. Kez kelgen halyktyng sana-sezimining, maedenijetining, ruwhynyng, salt-daestuerining, tilining kajta oerlewinen koerinis tabatyn ultyk mueddelerdi elewli daerezhede korgajtyn da nak osy kozgalystar. Kazakstanda da kazyr osy protsester zhuerip zhayr. Ultyk ideany zhuezege asyruw kogamga koeptegen ong naetijzheler berdi. Muny koermej, ulttardyng kajta oerlewge degen tabijgyi umtylysyn tek baskalardyng kukyktaryn shektew...dep karaw uelken kate bolar edi.

It is hardly necessary today to convince anyone of the obvious truth that national movements, particularly those in young independent states, play an uncommonly important role. It is they, in the first place, that uphold national interests represented by the regeneration of the people's consciousness, culture, spiritual values, traditions and language. These are exactly the processes that are unfolding in Kazakhstan today. Realization of the national ideal has brought about many positive results for the benefit of society. It would be a grave blunder to ignore this aspect, or to see in the only too natural striving of nations for self-survival...an infringement upon the rights of others...(ICS: 22)

Nazarbaev considers "keeping one's bearings" as the crucial remedy against "anomie," "a state of bewilderment, confusion of man facing a radically altered situation when the once-established system of values undergoes reassessment, uprooting habitual life ideals" (ICS: 6). Traditions are undoubtedly important as an anchor, yet *which* traditions? Earlier in the chapter, I mentioned Renan's comment that the construction of positive ethnic identity is as much a shared forgetting of some traditions as it is shared memories of others. Usually, it is the elites and counter-elites who determine what is to be remembered and what forgotten. Nazarbaev lists three negative traditions ill-suited for the present: "archaic forms of social arrangement, tribal mentality, and a system of legal views characteristic of the territorial organization of Kazakh society of the 18th-19th centuries" (p.40). As examples of positive Kazakh traditions, however, Nazarbaev mentions "national language, arts, culture, and family standards" (ICS: 10).

But how can a revival of positive traditions such as language and family standards, which are part of the nationalist agenda, proceed uneventfully alongside the internationalist agenda? Is it not precisely on issues such as language that there was so much acrimonious debate during *perestroika* and the first few years after Independence? The successful balance of Kazakh cultural-linguistic revival and the affirmation of equal rights for all the Republic's ethnic nationalities holds the answer to Kazakhstan's unclear future.

Nazarbaev gives his own answer: the regeneration of Kazakh self-awareness, culture, spiritual values, traditions and language is actually "the only too natural striving of nations for

self-revival....a return to a normal human state” (ICS:22) and thus implies that the other peoples should accordingly “accept the changes taking place in the consciousness of the Kazakh people with due understanding, [and] offer them moral and intellectual support.” Fair enough. Then comes what I feel is one of the most thoughtful insights that Nazarbaev expresses in the pamphlet:

Ekinshi zhagynan, zhanga zhagdajda baska halyktar da kalyptasuwdyng protsesterin bastan keship otyrganyn, bul da Kazak ulty zhagynan osyndaj tuesinistik pen katynasty talap eteninin koere biliw kazhet.

On the other hand, one should not disregard the fact that in new conditions, other peoples also experience complex formation processes which reciprocally require *an equally warm understanding and concern on the part of the Kazakh people* [italics added] (ICS: 22).

Indeed, to continue my earlier citation of Akiner about the Kazakhs being “by no means ill-disposed towards the Slavs (Akiner 1995: 71), she goes on to say in the very next sentence: “However, they [the Kazakhs] are still so concerned with the assertion of their own national independence that *they frequently fail to grasp the full extent of the psychological dislocation that their fellow citizens have suffered during the past few years* [italics added] (Akiner 1995: 71,72). Indeed, what is “only natural” for one person can be unnervingly unnatural for another. Nazarbaev continues the line of his argument:

Baskalarga bulaj karamajynsha oezin, oezining ulttyk kadir-kasijetin kueshtep syjlatuwga bolmajtyny aerkimge de tuesinikti boluwga tijis.

It should be clear to all that people can hardly inspire respect toward themselves and toward their ethnic dignity unless they acknowledge similar sentiments in other peoples (ICS: 22).

It will be seen later that this theme of mutual respect is largely absent in school discourse. In the talk of teachers and administrators, the predominant theme is: “How can the Russians respect us and our language, if we do not respect ourselves and our own language?” With the memory of Russian cultural and linguistic domination and with the on-going negative stereotyping of Kazakhs by Russians, the Kazakhs are more eager to gain Russian respect for their culture and language than to afford the same respect to the Russians.

But Nazarbaev is only internationalist to the extent that he *must* be in order to keep the political equilibrium between the huge Russian minority and the large block of Kazakh citizens with nationalist sentiments. His internationalism does not, as we have seen in the wording of the Constitutional drafts, keep him from publicly recognizing the role of the Kazakhs as the unequivocal leaders in implementing political, societal and economic reforms.

Koep ulttyk Kazakstanda zhalpy-ulttyk muedelerdi zhuezege asyruwdyng bir gana zholy bar ekeni ajdan . Ol Kazak ultynyng biriktiriwshi roeli zhagdajynda barlyk halyktardyng tengdigin kamtasyz etuw.

It is clear as the bright moon that, with the multi-ethnic nature of Kazakhstan's population, there exists only one way to meet everyone's needs: guarantee the equality of all peoples, with the Kazakh people playing the role of consolidator in the process (*ICS*: 22).

Once again, one sees the inherent contradiction of the Constitutional drafts which, of course, were heavily influenced by Nazarbaev. How can all the peoples of Kazakhstan be equal if one of them, the Kazakhs, are to be the leaders? Nazarbaev nevertheless insists that there is no other way, inferring, it seems, that if the regime exclusively stresses the equality of all peoples, the Kazakh nationalists will be upset and that if it only stresses the "integrating" role of the Kazakh people, the huge Russian minority will be disgruntled. Despite his wide-reaching powers as president, Nazarbaev still rules by consensus (Akiner, 1995: 74) and the threat of political destabilization by either nationalistic Kazakhs or nationalistic Russians is very real. The threat of destabilization perhaps explains Nazarbaev's categorical language of there being "no other way" than the one he proposes. In the sentence following the one cited above, he continues to use unequivocal language:

Kez kelgen baska zhol apatty kakygystarga, demokratijalyk reformalardyng tezheluwine aekelip soktyruwy muemkin. Osydan bajlanysty biz ueshin oezekti ideologialyk mindet ultaralyk kelisimdi kamtamasyz etuw bolyp tabylady.

Any other way is fraught with devastating conflicts and the democratic reforms grinding down to a standstill. In this context, our key ideological objective is to ensure inter-ethnic nationality accord (*ICS*: 23).

The way in which Nazarbaev proposes to maintain the equilibrium between Kazakhs and Russians is rather startling. Instead of making another futile attempt, as the old Soviet regime had done, "to unify all the nations into a single super-ethnic community, the Soviet people, who suffered an obvious fiasco" (*ICS*: 8), Nazarbaev recognizes the validity of the revival of each ethnic group's traditions via traditional institutions of the school, the family, the workplace as well as by ethnic nationality cultural centers which can play an important role not only in cultivating ethnic nationality consciousness but in becoming "genuine schools of internationalism...to overcome ethnic nationality narrow-mindedness, segregation, chauvinism, racism, and separatism" (*ICS*: 23).

It hardly seems possible that the regime could "make polyethnicity of our society a stable consolidating factor" without pursuing, even at political risk, a democracy based on equal rights rather than on favoritism of one ethnic nationality over another. Otherwise the nurturing of "the spirit of patriotism" (*ICS*:25) and a common sense of "being an integral part of our state"(*ICS*: 25) will remain an unrealizable goal. This goal could be achieved by a spirit of compromise: a reasonableness on behalf of Russians to recognize the validity of Kazakhstan's statehood, and a similar flexibility on behalf of Kazakhs to recognize the Russians' rights to equal opportunity. Having been denied the right to dual Russia-Kazakhstan citizenship, ethnic Russians who have decided to stay in Kazakhstan have only it to call their actual home.

It is not only Kazakh callousness toward others, however, but also Russian “stable negative stereotypes” (ICS: 8) toward the Kazakhs that hinder the process of moving toward greater democracy. Frustrated by these popular negative attitudes from the past and being reticent to play too loudly either the internationalist or nationalist theme for fear of upsetting one side or the other, the regime seems caught in limbo.

I will continue to discuss this policy statement in the next chapter on national-level language orientations but suffice it to say here that the climate described above is not conducive to the appearance of a Kazakh language-as-resource orientation among the many Russians who still hold negative stereotypes about the Kazakh language and are bitter over their narrowing choice of good job opportunities based on ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Nor is it conducive to Kazakh explicit recognition of Russian as a resource despite their continued widespread use of it at work, school and leisure. As will be seen in Chapter Three, the explicit recognition of Russian and all languages spoken by ethnic nationalities as the “common resource” of the Republic was deleted from the first draft of Kazakhstan’s first post-Independence Constitution and so never saw the light of day. However a commitment to a language-as-resource orientation for all languages in the Republic as well as equal opportunity for all citizens seem to be two prerequisites for lasting stability and prosperity in a land so rich in the diversity of its human and natural resources.

Concept of Sociocultural Development

The ideological pamphlet, *Concept of sociocultural development in the Republic of Kazakhstan*, was issued by the National Council on State Policy under the president’s office on November 17, 1993. It clearly expresses that priority must be given to the revival of Kazakh culture. Words which were highlighted in the original text are written in bold type face below.

*Endi Kazakstan halyktaryna oez maedenijetinin kelbetine kajtadan tolyk koeleminde ije boluwga tura keledi, al bul arada **Kazak maedenijetine**, jagnij memleketke tarijkhiy atawyn bergen halyktyng maedenijetine dawсыz **basymdyk beriluwge tijis**, oejtkeni ol Kazakstannan baska esh zherde shyn maeninde tuelep, kazhetinshe damij almajdy. Buryн san gasyrlyk otarshyldyk sajasattan enapat zardap shekken Kazak halkynyng ruwkhanij zhagynan shynajy tueluwi men onyng maedenijetining gueldenuwi kogamdagy aelewmettik-maedenij zhagdaj men moraldyk akhwaldyng kazheti moelsherde izgilikke zhetip, Kazakstannyng barlyk halyktary maedenijetining ojdagyday damytyly, zharsymdy ushtastyryluwyna zhaerdemesetin bolady.*

“BUU-nyng adam kukyktary zhoenindegi komijtetining kemsitpew turaly zhalpy erezhelerine” saejkes, eger elding bajyrgy halky uzak wakyт bojy taeweldi zhagdajda bolyp kelse, onyng maedenijetine degen buryngy zhol berilgen nakty kemsituwshikti tuezetiw ueshin mundaj aediletti aeri kazhetti bolyp tabylady.

It is right for all the peoples of Kazakhstan to have ownership over the full restoration of their cultures but it is, without dispute, **mandatory to give priority to the [revival of] Kazakh culture**, that is, the culture of the people who gave their historical name to the state, because it can not be sufficiently developed in a

true sense in any other place other than Kazakhstan. The true spiritual maturity of the Kazakh people, who have been victimized by colonial policy for centuries, and the flourishing of their culture will adequately benefit the socio-cultural situation. The cultures of all the people of Kazakhstan will be developed as envisioned, pleasantly joining together and helping each other.

According to the general stipulations of the U. N. Commission on Human Rights regarding non-discrimination, a point of view is both just and necessary which attempts for the sake of its culture to correct the real discriminations allowed in the past against the indigenous²¹ people of the nation who have been subjugated for a long period (pp. 8- 9).

The authors of the pamphlet give three grounds to justify the prioritization of reviving Kazakh culture before those of other ethnic nationalities. First, the correction of discriminations against indigenous peoples as stipulated by the U. N. Commission on Human Rights. The United Nations (*Basic Facts*, 1995: 206) defines “indigenous people” as “the descendants of those who inhabited a country or geographical region at a time when peoples of a different culture or ethnic origin arrived and subsequently became dominant through conquest, occupation, settlement or other means.” In 1982, the U. N.’s Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities (a sub-commission of the Commission on Human Rights) established a “Working Group on Indigenous Populations” which drafted the “Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” for adoption by the General Assembly. The draft was approved by the Subcommittee in 1994 (*Basic Facts*, 1995: 206-207).

The second ground that the authors use to legitimize the prioritization of reviving Kazakh culture is the benefit that the rejuvenation of “progressive” Kazakh traditions and values will bring to the other ethnic nationality cultures represented in the Republic. This theme is similar to the argument mentioned earlier in the chapter which President Nazarbaev used for prioritizing Kazakh culture: all the ethnic nationalities of the Republic will benefit from the full-fledged revival of positive indigenous moral and aesthetic traditions which had been suppressed or seriously eroded during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. However, this legitimization of the priority of Kazakh culture is reminiscent of the justification given in the Soviet period to the dominant role of Russian culture in the multi-ethnic U. S. S. R. (W. Fierman, personal communication, 1998).²²

Third, a point expanded elsewhere in the document, the continued degradation of culture during the turbulent post-Independence days makes the task of positive cultural revitalization all the more urgent.

Conclusion

²¹ The text uses the word “*bajyrgy*” for indigenous—the same word that was used in the final version of the preamble of the 1995 Constitution which I translated there as “ancient and indigenous.”

²² Fierman’s comment raises the fascinating question, beyond the scope of this work to answer, of whether the prioritization of one dominant culture in independent Kazakhstan is simply the unwitting recycling of old Soviet policy or, to some extent, a fresh and legitimate expression of nationalism in which one Great Tradition (to use Fishman’s phrase) is promoted for the sociocultural consolidation of the new state.

In its State Anthem, Emblem, and various policy statements, the current regime is constructing and promoting some positive metaphors to help the country become a peaceful, multiethnic, “uni-modal” nation. The government’s attempts to create Kazakh metaphors for inclusion of all ethnic nationalities represent an effort to draw from one Great Tradition to unify a nation out of what is now a multi-modal state of two major ethnic nationalities (and many others) with conflicting interests and sensibilities. The next chapter focuses on the government’s ideological struggle to achieve this goal of nation-building in sociolinguistic terms.